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Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007. Pp. 492. $65.00 (ISBN 0-674-02490-7).  
American constitutional historians and jurists have debated for decades what to make of the 
Constitution's relative silence about foreign affairs. The framers said a good deal about one aspect of 
foreign affairs—war powers—which they spelled out in some detail, allocating them between 
Congress and the President. But there are only a few provisions dealing with diplomacy and foreign 
affairs more generally, empowering the President to make treaties and name ambassadors, but only 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Nonetheless, the lesson of American history and 
constitutional law, at least since the early twentieth century, is that the President has the preeminent 
if not exclusive role in shaping and conducting U.S. foreign policy. 
  
      As the title of his book suggests, Ramsey's mission is to find a basis in the Constitution's text for the 
President's foreign affairs powers, and to use that text—as illuminated by history and the structure of 
the Constitution—as a basis for resolving the major issues as to the roles of the President, Congress, 
federal courts, and the states, in foreign affairs. His tools in accomplishing this mission are a keen, 
clear, and largely persuasive, legal analysis, combined with a careful but incomplete, and ultimately 
unsatisfactory, exploration of historical sources for the founding era. 
  
      Ramsey is not the first historian or constitutional scholar to take issue with the breathtaking extra-
constitutional conception of Presidential power over foreign affairs embodied in the Supreme Court's 
1936 Curtiss-Wright decision. There Justice Sutherland set forth the theory that the President has 
broad and exclusive authority over foreign affairs, derived not from the Constitution but from the 
sovereignty of the national government. Ramsey exposes substantial flaws in this theory, both as a 
matter of history and as inconsistent with the delegated-powers structure and theory of the 
Constitution. 
  
      Ramsey's alternate thesis is that a textual basis for the broad Presidential authority that we accept 
today can be found in the Vesting Clause of Article II, Section 1, which grants to the President the 
"executive power." His central argument is that the term "executive power" was understood by the 
founding generation to include the power to direct the foreign affairs of the nation, conducting 
diplomacy, entering into international agreements, settling disputes, and defending the nation from 
attack. But it does not include the power to legislate, i.e., to affect the domestic polity. So, for 
example, the Steel Seizure decision was correct, because President Truman was improperly extending 
his power as Commander in Chief to alter "domestic rights and duties within the U.S. legal system." 
  
      Ramsey courageously tackles most of the specific interpretive issues that have vexed scholars and 
that the courts have dodged or fudged: Can the President take the nation to war without a declaration 
of war or other authorization by Congress? Does the President's commander-in-chief power under 
Article II permit him to ignore laws passed by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers that impinge on 
his authority? Can a ratified treaty be terminated by the President without action by the Senate, 
whose consent was required to make the treaty effective in the first place? Can the President enter 
into "executive agreements" with other nations without the advice and consent of the Senate? Do 
such executive agreements preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause? Can the President, by 
adopting a foreign policy for the nation, himself preempt the states from acting inconsistently, or can 
only Congress by legislation trigger the Supremacy Clause? Is there a "dormant" foreign affairs power 
limiting the states in a manner comparable to the dormant Commerce Clause? Is customary 
international law part of U.S. law, and what are the respective roles of the President, Congress, and 
  
the courts in making it so? 
      In answering these questions, however, Ramsey's relentlessly logical analysis leads him to privilege 
the text while downplaying a basic belief of the founding-era generation that the Constitution set 
forth only a general framework to be fleshed out by experience. (His startling conclusions as to the 
role of states in foreign affairs, for example, may be supportable by textual exegesis but surely are 
trumped by the historical record.) Had Ramsey consulted The Documentary History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 1789–1800, he would have found material that would have given him a 
more complete understanding of the historical evidence he uses (Washington's appointment policy, 
the neutrality proclamation, advisory opinions, Ware v. Hylton, among other matters) and obliged him 
to temper some of his textual interpretations. Ramsey's excessive reliance on history found in law 
journal articles causes him to miss the nuances of many of the controversies he discusses (including 
the Steel Seizure Case) and mars the implementation of one of the express purposes of his work: to 
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